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HIV Reporting in California: By Name or by Number?
By Nicole Kamm*
I. INTRODUCTION
In California, 5,903 AIDS cases were recorded in 2003, making
for a cumulative total of 133,292 since the implementation of
nationwide mandatory AIDS case reporting.' There are no
comparable statistics for the number of HIV cases in the state because
California currently uses a code-based system called Unique Identifier
(UI) reporting.2 Under this model, patients' names are partially
codified by health care providers who transfer the information to local
health officials. 3  The local health department completes the
encryption and releases the data to state officials, who are then
responsible for reporting to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC).4 This process is intended to prevent the identity of
HIV-infected individuals from being released to federal authorities
because release of names is limited to the local level.
In 2004, the Los Angeles County Commission on HIV Health
Services ("Commission") issued a proposal in support of replacing the
current UI surveillance system with name-based HIV reporting, in
both Los Angeles County and statewide. 5 The Commission supported
* J.D. candidate 2006, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A., 2000,
University of California, Berkeley. Ms. Kamm wishes to thank her family, friends,
and Professor Ogden for their support and encouragement throughout this writing
process. Thanks also to Jason Friedlander for helping me to come up with such a
snappy title.
1. See http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats.htm#area (last visited on Feb. 2, 2005).
2. See http://www.statehealthfacts.org (last visited on Feb. 2, 2005).
3. See infra Part II.b. 1.
4. See infra Part III.b. 1.
5. Los Angeles County Commission on HIV Health Services, Policy Paper
Supporting State and Local Name-based Surveillance Systems at I [hereinafter
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this submission as a public health measure, in consideration of
allocation of federal funds, and with the understanding that the civil
rights concerns previously raised by name-based reporting systems
"have declined over the years." 6  Despite an undercurrent of
opposition, the Commission's proposal was approved in October
2004, and its representatives will proceed to advocate adoption of
name-based HIV reporting to the Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors and the governor of the State of California.
7
This comment examines the legal and policy considerations
surrounding HIV reporting systems. Specifically, it focuses on the
current controversy over California's HIV surveillance system. Part
II details the historical development of disease reporting, as well as
briefly describing the inception of the AIDS epidemic. Part III
examines the two most common HIV reporting systems, name-based
and UI reporting, and compares anonymous testing. Part IV reviews
the constitutional issues raised by HIV reporting systems. Part V
concludes the comment.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. History of Disease Reporting
The basis for all public health initiatives is the "collection,
analysis, and interpretation" of information regarding the health of a
Commission Paper on HIV Health Services]. The Commission serves as the state's
planning body for Title I of the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources
Emergency (CARE) Act and all other publicly funded HIV services programs
managed by the Office of AIDS Programs and Policy (OAPP). See
http://www.lapublichealth.org/aids/archives.html (last visited on Sept. 26, 2004).
The Commission's mission is "to decrease HIV/AIDS mortality and morbidity by
improving the quality and availability of comprehensive HIV/AIDS-related services
to needy individuals and families." Id. For more information about the Ryan
White CARE Act, see infra note 186 and accompanying text.
6. Commission Paper on HIV Health Services, supra note 5.
7. Id. In support of the Commission's objective, see 4 CALIFORNIA
PERFORMANCE REVIEW REPORT: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS chap 2, § HHS
14, Make California's HIV Reporting System Consistent With its AIDS Reporting
System and improve AIDS Reporting (2004), available at
http://cpr.ca.gov/report/cprrpt/issrec/hhs/hhsl4.html (last visited on February 2,
2005) [hereinafter California Performance Review].
specific population. 8 The first known example of disease surveillance
in the United States dates from a 1741 Rhode Island statute requiring
tavern owners to inform local health authorities about customers who
had contracted contagious diseases.9 Later, Rhode Island passed
similar legislation mandating the reporting of such diseases as
cholera, yellow fever, and small pox.'
0
In 1850, a report linking substandard living conditions and disease
was submitted to the Massachusetts Sanitary Commission. 1  In
connection with the report, state-supported reporting of health data
"by age, gender, occupation, socioeconomic level and locality" was
urged. 12  Possibly influenced by England and Wales, the federal
government also began publishing nationwide data on mortality at
that time. 13 Increased reliance on and improvement of mortality data
8. See Lawrence 0. Gostin and James G. Hodge, Jr., The "Names Debate ": the
Case for National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REv. 679,
available at
http://academic.udayton.edu/health/syllabi/Bioterrorism/5DiseaseReport/PHLaw 11.
htm (last visited on Sept. 26, 2004).
9. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, et. al., The Public Health Information
Infrastructure: A National Review of the Law on Health Information Privacy, 275
JAMA 1921 (1996).
The primary goal of surveillance is to track the course of a disease
in a population. The objectives of surveillance are, in this sense,
clearly population-based. Individuals are studied only to gather
data that can then be aggregated at the population level. A key
secondary goal of surveillance is to make possible a variety of
prevention and control measures.
Mira Johri, et. al., New Approaches to HIV Surveillance: Means and Ends, A
Summary Report of the Law, Policy and Ethics Conference on HIV Surveillance
(CIRA Working Paper Vol. 11.2, available at
http://cira.med.yale.edu/law-policy-ethics/workpapervol2iss2.html (last visited on
Oct. 17, 2005)).
10. See Gostin, supra note 8.
11. Id. at 690.
12. Id.
13. Id. William Farr, the Superintendent of the Statistical Department of the
General Registrar's Office of England and Wales, reported on health data from
1839 to 1879. Id. Farr noted mortality surveillance "will be an invaluable
contribution to therapeutics, as well as to hygiene, for it will enable the therapeutics
to determine the duration and fatality of all forms of disease ... Illusion will be
dispelled, quackery . . . suppressed, a science of therapeutics created, suffering
diminished, life shielded from many dangers." Id. at 691.
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led to more organized public health departments. 14  Reporting
expanded from purely death statistics to the detection and prevention
of diseases.' 5
By the early twentieth century, the federal government required
all states to report all common contagious diseases "dangerous to the
public health.' 6  In 1925, in response to confusion created by
differing state surveillance techniques, states were required to submit
uniform reports on the occurrence of infectious diseases to the United
States Public Health System. 7 The reports, however, revealed an
emerging conflict between public health officials' duty to prevent the
spread of disease throughout society and a physician's responsibility
to honor the doctor-patient privilege of non-disclosure of personal and
sensitive health information.
Public health officials typically understand their duty as in
response to the greater good of the population.' 8  In contrast,
physicians perceive their duty foremost to the individual patient. 19
Mandatory reporting requirements, while not without ultimate benefit
to the patient, conflict with physician obligations under the
Hippocratic Oath.2 ° Physicians also feared the legal consequences of
breaching patient confidentiality or being found liable for invasion of
privacy.2 1  Over time, the courts established a framework within
which physicians were relieved of excessive liability from such
claims while adhering to reporting requirements. 22 By the 1960's, it
became clear that the public need to stop the spread of communicable
diseases outweighed individual interests in the majority of
14. See id. at 690.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 692.
17. Id. at 692-93.
18. Id. at 693.
19. Id. at 693-94.
20. Id. at 694. In addition to other promises, the Hippocratic Oath is an ancient
ethical promise to "preserve a patient's health information." Id. Once sworn, a
doctor may be liable if such information is disclosed without the consent of the
patient. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 694-95. Consider the general standard-of-care rule that a doctor's
conduct must not fall below that of the average reasonable doctor in a comparable
situation.
25-2
circumstances.23 Today, reporting medical information to state and
federal health officials is routine practice.
B. The AIDS Epidemic
The first AIDS cases were reported in the United States in 1981 24
AIDS is a disease caused by HIV, a virus that progressively destroys
the body's ability to fight infection by impairing the immune system's
cells. 25 From its initial documentation in 1981, the number of AIDS
cases rose steadily, largely during the early stages in the urban centers
of New York, Los Angeles, Miami, and San Francisco.26 In 2003, the
Center for Disease Control (CDC) estimated a cumulative 929,985
AIDS cases in the United States.27
When first infected with HIV, many individuals do not develop
symptoms; however, some experience a flu-like illness within the first
few months of exposure.28 More severe symptoms may not develop
for years, but HIV destroys the immune system's cells, detectable by
the decline in the blood levels of CD4+ T-cells during this period.
29
The first laboratory test for HIV was developed in 1985 and some
states began making cases of HIV reportable by name the following
year.3°
AIDS refers to the most advanced stages of HIV infection. 31 In
1993, the CDC, the agency responsible for tracking the spread of the
23. Id. at 695.
24. See AEGIS: AIDS Education Global Information System [hereinafter
AEGIS], available at http://www.aegis.com (last visited on February 2, 2005).
25. See id.
26. See June E. Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: Discovery of a New Disease, in
AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 25-26 (Harlon L. Dalton, et al. eds.,
1987).
27. Statistics available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats.htm#aidscases (last
visited on Oct. 6, 2004).
28. See AEGIS, supra note 24. Symptoms may include fever, headache,
enlarged lymph nodes, and fatigue. Id.
29. See id. The duration of this period varies considerably from person to
person. Id.
30. Gordon Bunch and Douglas Frye HIV Epidemiology Program, HIV
Reporting in Los Angeles County, http://www.ladhs.org/hiv (last visited on February
2, 2005) [hereinafter HIV Reporting in L.A. County].
31. See AEGIS, supra note 24.
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disease and developing the official criteria for its diagnosis, revised its
definition of AIDS to include all persons who are HIV-positive and
who have fewer than 200 CD4+ T cells. 32 In addition, the definition
includes a list of twenty-six "opportunistic infections" that affect
people with advanced HIV infection.3 3 Most of these conditions are
not ordinarily life-threatening to healthy individuals, but may be fatal
to people with AIDS because their immune systems have been
severely weakened and cannot fight off bacteria and viruses.34
In 1995, the AIDS epidemic reached critical mass as the number
of reported cases exceeded one-half million. 35  Today, the CDC
reports the number of AIDS infected individuals in the United States
to be nearing one million and an estimated 850,000-950,000 people
living with HIV, including between 18,000 and 28,000 that do not
know they are infected. 36 Though the rate at which the disease is
transmitted has slowed, the continuing rise in number of infected
individuals indicates the crisis is not over and the need to monitor and
control the spread of the disease persists.
32. See id. Healthy adults generally have CD4+ T-cells counts of 1000 or
more. Id. Individuals who have been infected with HIV may experience dramatic
drops in cell count or may experience a gradual decline in the number of these cells.
Id.
33. See id. The CDC list of opportunistic infections includes pneumocystis
pneumonia, invasive cervical cancer, HIV encephalopathy, chronic isosporiasis, and
wasting syndrome, among others. Outside of the United States, most countries use
one of the two AIDS case definitions promulgated by the World Health
Organization (WHO). HIV/AIDS Surveillance and Reporting in the United States,
http://www.hivinsite.ucsf.edu (last visited on February 2, 2005). The first is
recommended in cases where there is limited access to HIV antibody testing and
defines AIDS as having at least two of the "major signs" and at least one of the
"minor signs" of the disease. Id. at 3. Major signs include drastic weight loss or
chronic diarrhea or fever persistent for more than one month. Id. Minor signs
include cough for over one month or chronic herpes infection. Id. If HIV antibody
testing is more readily available, WHO defines the disease as testing positive for
HIV, as well as suffering from at least one of the various conditions from a list
similar to the CDC's list of "opportunistic infections." Id.
34. See AEGIS, supra note 24.
35. See http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/faststats/aids-hiv.html (last visited on
February 2, 2005).
36. See id.
III. HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
In response to the epidemic, state and federal governments began
to create legislation intended to monitor the spread of AIDS. In 1983,
AIDS was added to California's list of reportable diseases and
conditions. 37  The following year, nationwide confidential name-
based AIDS reporting began.38 By this measure, patient names are
reported to local and state health departments and stored in registries
for ongoing surveillance. 39 Reporting of the names of persons with
AIDS is essential to understanding and controlling the epidemic and
has served as "the backbone" of treatment and prevention strategies.
40
AIDS surveillance is widely accepted today as a requisite method for
halting the spread of the disease.4'
However, by advances in detection and therapy for HIV, most
notably through the highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART),
persons with HIV infection are living longer without progressing to
the CDC's clinical definition of AIDS.42 In 1996, the incidence of
both deaths and opportunistic infections caused by AIDS dropped in
the United States for the first time in the history of the epidemic. 43 As
37. HIV Reporting in L.A. County, supra note 30. In 1981, the first AIDS
cases were reported by name to federal public health officials to investigate the
disease outbreak. Id.
38. HIV/AIDS Surveillance Technical Report: Commentary, No. 1, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/hastr1100/commentary.html (last visited on Sept. 26,
2004).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Local health departments identify between ninety-five and ninety-eight
percent of California's AIDS cases through name-based reporting, seeking case
information from health care providers. This data is then forwarded to the state's
HIV/AIDS Case Registry. California Performance Review, supra note 7. State
health officials then verify the accuracy and completeness of the data and then pass
along the information to the CDC via a secure, electronic data system. Id.
California's AIDS reporting system is "confidential" in that only authorized
personnel have access to the patient's names, which are protected with security
systems at all levels. Id.
42. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
43. Johri et al., supra note 9 at 1. That same year, deaths due to AIDS
decreased 23 percent in the general population. Id. Certain sub-groups, such as
homosexual and bisexual men with a thirty percent observed, had an even greater
decline. Id.
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a result, AIDS surveillance systems no longer reflected an accurate or
complete picture of HIV in the United States.44 AIDS surveillance
systems focus mainly on the most advanced stage of HIV that,
without effective treatment, develops on average about ten years after
initial infection.45 Surveillance of the end-stages of HIV started to be
recognized as "inadequate in accurately portraying how HIV infection
is developing and spreading, and hence faulty as a basis for designing
effective medical and public health interventions."
46
In 1999, the CDC released a formal report recommending all
states conduct HIV case surveillance in addition to their current AIDS
surveillance system.47 The CDC noted HIV surveillance was a
necessary response to the changing face of the disease and that AIDS
surveillance alone did not properly demonstrate the need for increased
care and prevention services for those infected with HIV.48 Further,
AIDS surveillance did not indicate the dramatic rise in new HIV
infections in women, heterosexuals, or people of color.49
In its report, the CDC reviewed a variety of studies on two
alternative HIV surveillance systems: name-based and unique
identifier reporting.' ° The first system reports an individual's HIV
status to the state health agency using the person's name.51 The
second uses a code, or unique identifier, thereby keeping the identity
44. Though AIDS surveillance is often touted as the "gold standard" for disease
surveillance, it is also recognized as an incomplete representation of the epidemic in
this country because it only reports "full-blown" AIDS cases. HIV/AIDS
Surveillance and Reporting in the United States, HIV In Site, available at
http://www.hivinsite.ucsf.edu (last visited on Oct. 25, 2004). These statistics do not
include information about new infections, which is invaluable to prevention
planning. Id.
45. Johri et al. supra note 9, at 1.
46. Id. at 1-2.
47. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Guidelines for National
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Case Surveillance, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 13 (1999).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. HIV Reporting in L.A. County, supra, note 30, at slide 8.
51. See generally Stacey D. Blayer, But Names Will Never Hurt Me: HIV
Surveillance & Mandatory Reporting, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1175, 1186-89.
of the patient confidential.52 The CDC requested that states evaluate
the importance of surveillance data, as well as balance public health
concerns against the need to protect patients' privacy interests in
choosing a reporting system.53  However, the CDC concluded by
advising state and local surveillance programs "to use the same
confidential name-based approach for HIV surveillance as is currently
used for AIDS surveillance nationwide. 54  Despite this
recommendation, the CDC noted some states have adopted the code-
based unique identifier system and technical assistance will be
provided by the agency regardless of which system a state decides to
use.
The CDC's proposal caused controversy. AIDS reporting had
gained wide acceptance, both by public and private factors, based
mainly on the relatively short length of patients' survival and the
obvious need to establish links to health and support services. HIV
reporting, on the other hand, spurred loud opposition, largely in
response to the perceived potential for discrimination and violations
of privacy." The debate divided those who supported HIV reporting
by name and those who favored the alternative system of anonymous
reporting by code.
A. Name-based HIV Reporting
In name-based HIV reporting systems, the name of the individual
being tested is attached to their blood samples, which are typically
sent out to laboratories for testing.56 If the result of the test is positive
for HIV, the lab reports the name of the individual to the state heath
department. 57 The state health department enters the name into an
52. Id. "Confidential" reporting refers to a system where a person's name is
"confidentially" reported to public health authorities, as opposed to "anonymous"
testing where the person being tested never provides this identification and no name
is sent to authorities. Id. The CDC called name-based reporting the "simplest, most
reliable and feasible method currently available." Charles Ornstein, California
Officials Track New HIV Cases, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at Al.
53. HIV/AIDS Surveillance Technical Report, supra note 38, at 8.
54. Id.
55. Johri et al., supra note 9, at 2.
56. See AEGIS, supra note 24.
57. See id.
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HIV registry and then transfers the data to the CDC.58 Since all states
already have name-based AIDS reporting systems in place,
implementing a similar system for HIV reporting would require little
alteration.
There are several arguments in support of name-based HIV
reporting. First, name-based reporting is the "standard method" for
reporting all other reportable diseases and is based on "sound public
health policy proven effective over time."5 9  Second, name-based
reporting is less expensive and more efficient. 60 Finally, failure to
report accurate rates of HIV cases will lead to reduced funding. 61
Name-based HIV reporting has received the support of most major
health care authorities and among public health communities. 62 It
arguably provides greater uniformity across the country,6 3 makes it
58. See id.
59. Commission Paper on HIV Health Services, supra note 5, at 2. The
Commission notes that names are reported only to the state and HIV and AIDS
cases sent to the CDC are only identified by code, and that all other personal
identifying information is removed. Id. at 2. There is less potential risk of identity
disclosure because names are kept in a single registry, rather than in multiple logs as
under the UI system. Id. Finally, incomplete or incorrect UI codes are common,
time-consuming to correct and may result in multiple reporting of a single
individual. Id. at 3. Reliable, accurate information is critical for effective public
health. Id.
60. Id. at 2. The unique identifier system requires both a lab report and a
provider report. Id. It is often difficult to reconcile the lab work with the
individual's medical record. Id. There is more room for error when more parties
are involved and the regulations are more complex to comply with. Id.
Furthermore, the individual must reveal much of the same identifying information
as in name-based reporting in order to create the unique identifier. Id. at 3.
61. Id. at 5. The Commission notes this is especially true regarding the Ryan
White CARE Act and in allocation of Housing for People with AIDS (HOPWA)
and Title III funds. See discussion infra Part V.a. 1. Funding reductions will occur
because incomplete sets of data will not be, or will only partially be accepted by
funding sources, while jurisdictions that use name-based HIV reporting systems will
have more accurate data, collected more easily, therefore benefit by greater
allocation of funds. Commission Paper on HIV Health Services, supra note 5, at 5.
62. Id.
63. Thirty-six states use name-based HIV reporting systems, five states use
name-to-code identifier systems (initially names are collected and, after any
necessary public health follow-up, those names are converted to codes by the
provider and the information is transferred to the state), two allow client choice of
name or code and seven (including California) use a code-only system. Texas,
easier to link individuals to public health services and treatments,
64
and allows providers to more easily follow-up with patients should
the need arise. 65
Opponents of name-based reporting point out that it may dissuade
individuals from seeking testing, which will ultimately reduce the
overall accuracy of the data by limiting the completeness of the
population sample.6 6 Of note, often members of marginalized groups
are more fearful of invasions of privacy, discrimination, or of
government in general, and therefore are more likely to be
discouraged from seeking testing.67 Risk information is necessary in
research and to develop social services, but a determined effort to
collect good, complete information will not depend on name-based
reporting. As to the argument that name-based reporting facilitates
linkage to care for people infected with HIV, studies show most state
health departments lack the resources, personnel, or intent to provide
access to care.68 Further, states have not historically used the AIDS
registry, compiled from state AIDS cases federally mandated to be
reported by name, to ensure patients' access to therapeutic
interventions and follow-up care. 69 There is apparently no guarantee
name-based reporting will result in improved linkages to care.
Rather, new programs will have to be developed to ensure a
connection between HIV infected persons and health care.
B. Unique Identifier HIV Reporting
Unique identifier HIV reporting is the alternative to name-based
systems. The unique identifier (UI) system creates a code from the
Puerto Rico, and Kentucky used the unique identifier system and have since
changed to name-based HIV reporting. California Performance Report, supra note
7, at 2.
64. Id.
65. Commission Paper on HIV Health Services, supra note 5, at 5.
66. Johri et al., supra note 9, at 6.
67. See infra note 205 and accompanying text. In response to this argument,
the CDC recommended each state continue to offer anonymous testing. Johri et al.,
supra note 9, at 6. However, to the extent this alternative is more frequently used
by certain sub-groups, the sample population will remain incomplete because the
data is not reported.
68. Johri et al., supra note 9, at 6.
69. Id.
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individual's personal and medical information, the purpose of which
is to associate the code with the HIV test result, rather than the
identity of the individual.7 ° Numbers and letters are assembled to
create an identifier that provides data about HIV infection, as well as
other demographic information.7 Meanwhile, the identity of the
individual remains protected because, in theory, the code should not
be able to be linked to their test results.72
In the early days of HIV surveillance, concern about name-based
reporting led Maryland and Texas to implement a system using code-
based identifiers.73 Both states implemented a twelve digit numeric
UI code, formed by the last four digits of a patients' social security
number, six digit date of birth, one digit code for race/ethnicity, and
one digit code for sex.74 The use of Uls allowed for the collection and
storage of data that was virtually unidentifiable. Under this system,
HIV infection reports submitted to state health officials contained
residence data, information about the testing facility, and the date of
test, but did not include mode of transmission, which is included in
most name-based reports. 75  To promote follow-up, health care
70. See AEGIS, supra note 24. Other examples of Uls are social security
numbers, bank account numbers, and driver's license numbers. However, these
examples may lend support to arguments against this method of surveillance as a
means to maintain anonymity. When the social security number was implemented
in 1936, the federal government assured its citizens that the numbers would only be
used for Social Security purposes and would remain strictly confidential. Catherine
Hanssens, Comments on the CDC's "Draft Guidelines for HIV Case Surveillance,
Including Monitoring HIV Infection and AIDS" (Jan. 11, 1999),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/resources.html.record360 (last
visited Sept. 15, 2005). Today, however, the social security number is used for
numerous identification purposes, lending itself to frequent cases of fraud and
invasion of privacy. Id.
71. See AEGIS, supra note 24. Sometimes codes may include symbols or
numbers that represent gender, age, or ethnicity. Id.
72. See id.
73. Evaluation of HIV Case Surveillance Through Non-Name Unique
Identifiers - Maryland and Texas 1994-1996, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION WEEKLY (January 9, 1998),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00050807.htm (last visited on Oct.
25, 2004).
74. Id.
75. Id.
providers were required to maintain a log linking the UI to the
patient.76
In response, the CDC expressed several concerns about the UI
systems. They found name-based surveillance was more complete
and better able to document risk factors, that the UI system created an
administrative burden, and that it had the potential for duplication of
cases or mismatched reports.7 7 However, upon review three years
later, the CDC found the system had substantially improved and
current data "showed high levels of uniqueness for the UI, a high
degree of completeness of UI elements, and a greater completion of
reporting." 78 In response, public health officials were "satisfied with
the degree of accuracy of these data" and civil rights activists felt the
UI system was "advantageous in mitigating the potential for invasion
of privacy and discrimination, and fhence unlikely to discourage
people from seeking testing." 79
An additional concern about UI HIV reporting is the
appropriateness of the system for areas of the country where there are
large populations of people who may not have social security
numbers, for example, through illegal immigration. In these areas,
the method for creating Uls should be tailored to the community.
Maryland has created a provision for those without or unwilling to
disclose a social security number that inserts a "dummy 9999" code. 80
The state concedes this may compromise the data to some extent, but
the resulting drawbacks are considerably less than name-based
reporting, where many might avoid testing altogether.81 The true
problems, Maryland points out, with surveillance of illegal
immigrants are present despite the system of HIV reporting adopted.82
76. Id. Regarding reservations over the issues of patient follow-up and
collection of risk data, it has been conceded that name-based reporting has
advantages in terms of follow-up. Johri et al., supra note 9, at 8. However,
collection of risk data appears to be about "average" in states with code-based HIV
reporting systems. Id. Many states with name-based systems are less efficient at
follow-up than states like Maryland, who employ a UI surveillance system. Id.
77. Johri et al., supra note 9, at 8.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
HIV Reporting in CaliforniaFall 2005
558 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-2
A final consideration is that individuals may be confused between
confidential testing, under which both name-based and code-based
HIV reporting systems fall, and anonymous testing. 3 Many who
undergo testing in states with UI systems may not understand that the
identifier can be re-linked to the individual records, based on the case
report to the state. 84 This can be addressed by requiring health care
providers to consult patients before testing and anonymous testing
should remain an option, even in states with unique identifier systems.
1. California's System
California's UI HIV reporting surveillance system became
effective on July 1, 2002.85 Since that date, local health departments
have reported 29,970 HIV cases to the state.8 6 State and local staffs
continue to train and provide technical assistance to health care
providers and laboratories to ensure the resulting data is as accurate as
possible.8 7
Specifically, California's code-based process works in the
following manner: First, along with the blood sample sent to the lab
for testing, the health care provider attaches the patient's last name,
date of birth, gender, date blood was collected, and name, address,
and phone number of provider and facility where services were
83. See discussion infra Part III.c.
84. See discussion infra Part III.b. 1.
85. Dept. of Health Services: Office of AIDS, HIVNon-Name Code Reporting
in California, HIV Update: March 2004
http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ps/ooa/HIVReporting/pdf/HQU.pdf (last visited on February
2, 2005) [hereinafter HIV Non-Name Code Reporting]. California was one of the
last states to implement an HIV surveillance system, due in large part to
disagreement between public health officials and civil liberty advocates. Ornstein,
supra note 52, at A3.
86. HIV Non-Name Code Reporting, supra note 85, at 1.
87. Id. A San Francisco Department of Public Health study evaluating the
accuracy of California's UI HIV reporting system found results were properly
matched to patients ninety-five percent of the time and complete records were
produced eighty-nine percent of the time, concluding a "non-name-based laboratory
reporting system for HIV is feasible." San Francisco Dept. of Public Health,
Evaluation of a Non-Name-based HIV Reporting System in San Francisco,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov (last visited on February 2, 2005).
rendered. 88  The lab returns the confirmed HIV test result and a
"partial code," including the date of birth and gender, to the health
care provider. 89 The lab also reports the partial code, as well as the
date the specimen was tested, the name, address, and phone number
of both the lab and the provider, the results of the HIV test, and the
lab report number as assigned by the lab to the local health
department. 90 After receiving the results from the lab, the health care
provider transfers the completed HIV/AIDS Confidential Case Report
form, including the UI (partial code plus last four digits of the
patient's social security number), name, address, and phone number
of provider, and race/ethnicity addendum to the local health
department. 91  Next, the local health department submits the
information to the state Department of Health Services, Office of
AIDS (DHS), using the UI created by the health care provider.92
Finally, DHS submits the aggregate HIV case data to the CDC, absent
the UI code.93 Perhaps, by this description of the process, one can
sympathize with the Commission's recommendation to replace the UI
method with one that merely requires the recitation of a first and last
name.
94
C. Anonymous HIV Testing
Whether or not a state uses name-based or unique identifier HIV
reporting, individuals may be tested at an anonymous test site or by
anonymous physician test. Only results from confidential testing are
reportable, therefore anonymous testing remains an option for
individuals who truly fear having their HIV diagnosis reported by
name or even having their name associated with a unique identifier
88. HIV Non-Name Code Reporting, supra note 85, at 1.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id
94. However, the Commission acknowledges that most laboratories are
complying with the current system and completeness of data on individual case
reports is comparable to that of AIDS case data. HIV Reporting in L.A. County,
supra note 30. See infra Part V for further discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of each system.
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code. 95 At an anonymous test site, general demographic information
is recorded, such as race, ethnicity, sex, age, and gender.96 Names,
addresses, birth dates, or social security numbers are not disclosed. 97
If the person tests positive for HIV, the combined information is
transferred to public health officials, void of personal identification.
98
The disadvantage to anonymous testing is that an individual will only
be able to receive their result verbally. The testing site will not
provide any tangible proof the person was tested or that the result was
negative or positive. This can potentially hinder the person. For
example, some agencies, such as HIV/AIDS Legal Services Alliance
(HALSA), require evidence of HIV-positive status to obtain free legal
services.99 In other cases, a partner may want confirmation their mate
has been tested and of the result before proceeding with the
relationship.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Right to Privacy
1. Jacobson v. Massachusetts
The Supreme Court has not addressed the right of privacy as
relating to mandatory HIV reporting schemes. However, the Court
has addressed the scope of the state's police power to protect public
health and safety and held a statute requiring smallpox vaccination of
adults did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the
95. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., A Brief Guide to California's HIV/AIDS Laws
4-5 (Mar. 2004) (last visited on February 2, 2005) [hereinafter A Brief Guide to
HIV/AIDS Laws]. See also The Body: The Complete HIV/AIDS Resource,
http://www.thebody.com/cdc/testing/testing.html (last visited on Oct. 28, 2004), for
general information about anonymous HIV testing and site locations.
96. A Brief Guide to HIV/AIDS Laws, supra note 95.
97. Id.
98. In support of its intent to replace the current unique identifier system with
names-based reporting, the Los Angeles Commission on HIV Health Services
"strongly supports the continued availability of anonymous testing and would
oppose any change." Commission Paper on HIV Health Services, supra note 5, at
1.
99. See http://www.halsaservices.org (last visited on Sept. 26, 2004).
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Constitution. 00 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, plaintiff argued that a
statute's smallpox vaccination requirement violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and "tended to subvert and defeat the purposes of the
Constitution as declared in its Preamble."10' The Court recognized
the state's authority to enact various regulations "to safeguard the
public health and the public safety."' 12 Further, the Court noted the
state's power to restrict an individual's liberty to secure the general
comfort, health, and wellbeing of its citizens.10 3  Weighing state
police power to protect the people against the rights of the individual,
the Court determined that protecting the public against a potential
smallpox epidemic outweighed the individual's right to refuse the
vaccination because the vaccination was a reasonable means to
prevent the spread of such disease.' 04 Therefore, the Court upheld the
statute as constitutional.' 05
2. Griswold v. Connecticut
The Constitution does not explicitly establish an individual right
to privacy, however this does not mean one does not exist. The Court
in Griswold established such a right by way of the Bill of Rights.
0 6
This landmark case interpreted the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments to denote a privacy right to all citizens.10 7 In
1965, Planned Parenthood League's executive director and medical
director, convicted as accessories for providing information,
instruction, and medical advice to married couples as to methods of
preventing conception, alleged the Connecticut law forbidding use of
contraceptives violated the Fourteenth Amendment.10 8  The Court
ruled that, although not a "super-legislature" meant to interpret the
100. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12, 39 (1905).
101. Id. at 13-14.
102. Id. at 25. The Court also recognized the state's authority to quarantine a
citizen "against his will." Id. at 29.
103. Id. at 26.
104. Id. at 39.
105. Id.
106. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
107. Id. at 484.
108. Id. at 480.
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reasoning behind a statute, 0 9 the Court was charged with protecting
certain fundamental rights, even if those rights were not explicit in the
Constitution. 110 The Court then noted the association of people is not
mentioned in Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, but has been
"construed" as inviolable nonetheless."' Finally, the Court balanced
the individual's privacy interest against the state's police power to
invade the marital bedroom, and held the law was unjustified because
it was an overly broad governmental intrusion into an area of
protected freedoms." 2 In sum, the Court held the Connecticut statute
prohibiting the use of contraception by married couples violated the
constitutional right to privacy.11 3
Clearly, there is a privacy right within one's marriage. However,
the question remains how far this right extends.
3. Whalen v. Roe
In Whalen v. Roe, the Court addressed the issue of whether New
York, in an attempt to prevent an illegal drug market, could require a
record of names and addresses of all persons taking certain
medications.'' 4 In Whalen, patients and physicians brought suit to
enjoin enforcement of a statute that required physicians to produce
copies of prescriptions of certain drugs to the State Health
Department for entry into the State's computerized database." 5 The
district court held the statute intruded upon the "doctor-patient"
relationship with a "needlessly broad sweep."" 6 The Supreme Court
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The Court also lists the right to educate a child in a school of the
parent's choice, the right to study a foreign language, the right to distribute, receive,
and read, and the freedoms of inquiry, thought, to teach, and of the entire university
community. Id. None of the foregoing are explicit, but the "Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance." Id. at 484.
112. Id. at 485.
113. Id. at 486.
114. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 590 (1977).
115. Id. at 589.
116. Id. at 595. The district court noted: "the doctor-patient relationship is one
of the zones of privacy accorded constitutional protection." Id.
disagreed, holding the statute was a reasonable exercise of the State's
broad police power by recognizing New York's "vital interest in
controlling the distribution of dangerous drugs."' 17 Further, there was
no cause to assume the security safeguards of the statute would be
improperly administered." 8 The Court then recognized two different
applications of the constitutional right to privacy: "the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in
making certain kinds of important decisions."" 9
Acknowledging that some people may defer much needed medical
treatment due to concerns of stigma or privacy, the Court reasoned
disclosure of information to medical personnel does not
"automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy"
because such an exchange is often part of regular medical
encounters. 2 ° The Court noted, for example, that statutory reporting
requirements for venereal disease, child abuse, injuries caused by
deadly weapons and certifications of fetal death could likewise be
justified as essential to modern medical practice, despite similar
potential for poor reflection on the character of the individual. 2' In
addition, the Court pointed out the New York statute did not deprive
the patient of access to medication because it did not prohibit use
entirely, nor condition access on the consent of "any state official or
other third party." 122 Again, balancing these concerns against the
State's interest, the Court held the statute did not impermissibly
violate the patient's privacy rights.' 23
The Court included a "final word" about matters left
unaddressed.124  Noting the "threat to privacy implicit in the
117. Id. at 598.
118. Id. at 601. The statute does not "pose a sufficiently grievous threat to
either interest to establish a constitutional violation," at least on its face. Id.
However, the Court does acknowledge that some people's concern may deter them
from seeking "needed medical attention." Id. Regardless, disclosure of medical
information is "often an essential part of modem medical practice even when the
disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient." Id. at 602.
119. Id. at 599-600.
120. Id. at 590.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 603.
123. Id. at 604.
124. Id. at 605.
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accumulation of vast amounts of personal information," the Court
recognized the governmental duty to avoid disclosure, rooted in the
Constitution. 125 The Court then stated it had not decided any issue
regarding the unauthorized disclosure of private data, whether
intentional or unintentional or under a statute with insufficient
safeguards. 126 However, as to the case at hand, the Court held that the
New York statute did not violate the patient's constitutional right to
privacy. 127
There are two points in Whalen that resonate for mandatory HIV
reporting. First, the mere possibility of a breach of medical
information is not facially unconstitutional. And second, the Court
acknowledged some New York citizens may avoid or postpone
treatment because of stigma or other privacy concerns. Disclosure,
the Court found, is part of modem medicine and "does not
automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy.'
128
Therefore, a claim cannot rest solely on a future breach argument.
4. United States v. Westinghouse
In United States v. Westinghouse, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health's (NIOSH) access to the medical
records of certain employees did not violate their constitutional right
to privacy. 129 After a request for a health hazard evaluation from a
Westinghouse employee, NIOSH sought access to medical records of
Westinghouse employees who may have been exposed to dangerous
chemicals in the plant. 130 The district court relied on Whalen, holding
public interest granted NIOSH the authority to view the medical
records.' 3' The court of appeals affirmed, but used strong language
regarding a citizen's constitutional right to privacy.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 603-04.
128. Id.
129. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580 (3d Cir.
1980).
130. Id. at 570, 572.
131. Id. at 573.
Recognizing the sensitive nature of information concerning one's
body and heath status, the court reasoned "an employee's medical
records, which may contain intimate facts" clearly fall within a zone
entitled to privacy protection.' 32  However, the court noted that
intrusion into this zone is justified if the societal interest in disclosure
outweighs the privacy interest in the specific facts at hand. 133 The
court identified seven factors to be weighed in deciding whether
disclosure of personal information is justified: (1) the type of record
requested, (2) the information it does or might contain, (3) the
potential for harm by subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, (4) the
injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was
generated, (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized
disclosure, (6) the degree of need for access, and (7) whether there is
a statutory mandate, public policy, or other recognizable public
interest militating toward access.' 34
Balancing these factors, the court concluded the strong public
interest in occupational safety and health, the fact that the records
were reasonably related to the inquiry, and adequate safeguards
against unauthorized disclosure justified the intrusion into the
employee's medical records.' 35 Thus, the court concluded NIOSH's
access to certain employee's medical records did not violate their
constitutional right to privacy.' 36
The seven Westinghouse factors may be particularly useful in
determining whether HIV reporting, specifically mandatory, name-
based reporting systems, is justified or whether an individual's right
to privacy remains constitutionally protected. The following line of
cases directly addresses the issue of whether an individual has a
constitutional right to privacy in their HIV/AIDS status.
5. Doe v. Borough of Barrington
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
held in Doe v. Borough of Barrington that a police officer's disclosure
132. Id. at 577.
133. Id. at 578.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 578-80.
136. Id. at 580.
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of an individual's AIDS status violated the individual's and the
family's right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. 137 In
Borough of Barrington, plaintiffs alleged they suffered harassment,
discrimination, and humiliation after an officer disclosed to neighbors
that "Doe" had AIDS. 138 The court held the right to privacy in this
case "extends to members of the AIDS patient's immediate family"
because of the broad impact of the disclosure of such sensitive
medical information. 139 The court then reasoned the privacy interest
in one's AIDS status is greater than in other medical records because
of the stigma that accompanies the disease. 140 In holding that an
individual's privacy interest in medical information and records is not
absolute, the court stated the government must demonstrate a
compelling interest in invading that privacy.141 The court found that
disclosure of Doe's confidential information did not advance a
compelling government interest in preventing the spread of the
disease because there was no risk that the neighbors might be exposed
to the virus through casual contact with Doe or his family. 142 In
conclusion, the court held the police officer's disclosure regarding an
individual's AIDS status violated the constitutional right to privacy. 143
6. Doe v. City of New York
In Doe v. City of New York, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that there is a constitutional right to privacy in
137. Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D. N.J. 1990).
138. Id. at 579.
139. Id. at 584. "The stigma attaches not only to the AIDS victim, but to those
in contact with AIDS patients." Id. "Revealing that one's family or household
member has AIDS causes the whole family to be ostracized." Id. at 585.
140. Id. at 584. Further, the court acknowledges the greater social impact on
the individual. For example, "moral judgments about the high-risk activities
associated with the disease, including sexual relations and drug use" heighten the
need to protect one's right to privacy in their AIDS condition. Id. at 583. "The
potential for harm in the event of nonconsensual disclosure is substantial; plaintiffs
brief details the stigma and harassment that comes with public knowledge of one's
affliction with AIDS." Id.
141. Id. at 585.
142. Id.
143. Id.
one's HIV status. 144 In City of New York, plaintiff alleged his right to
privacy was violated when the City of New York publicly revealed
details of a discrimination suit settlement against Delta Airlines based
on Doe's HIV status. 14' The district court granted the City's motion
to dismiss, finding the matter of public record once the original
discrimination complaint was filed. 146 The Second Circuit found for
the plaintiff, reasoning the right to privacy includes an individual's
right to avoid disclosure of one's health status because of its personal
nature.147  Further, the court held this is especially relevant for
individuals infected with HIV and AIDS because revealing their
positive status may subject them to discrimination or intolerance. 48
In sum, there is a constitutional right to privacy in one's HIV status.
This ruling is of great importance to those people infected with the
disease, as well as to evaluations of HIV surveillance.
7. Doe v. Wigginton
The Sixth Circuit held in Doe v. Wigginton that the disclosure to a
corrections officer of a prisoner's HIV status did not violate the
prisoner's constitutional right to privacy.' 49 In Wigginton, a prisoner
claimed his constitutional right to privacy was violated when a prison
officer opened a "confidential" medical file containing information
regarding the prisoner's HIV-positive condition. 150  The court
reiterated "a constitutional right of nondisclosure would force courts
144. Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994).
145. Id. at 265.
146. Id. at 266.
147. Id. at 267. The court further distinguished the right to privacy as a right to
"confidentiality" and held "the right to confidentiality includes the right to
protection regarding information about the state of one's health." Id.
148. Id. Admitting this is an unfortunate truth "among many in this society"
about people infected with "a fatal, incurable disease." Id. This case was written
more than a decade ago. Though HIV and AIDS are no longer necessarily fatal,
they remain incurable. Further, the stigma, discrimination, and intolerance that
attaches to HIV and AIDS continues to be the prevailing social sentiment. This not
only causes people to keep their status confidential, it may result in their avoidance
of the issue altogether - including not getting tested for the disease at all. See
discussion infra Parts V.a.3, 4.
149. Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994).
150. Id. at 736.
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to 'balance almost every act of government, both state and federal,
against its intrusion on a concept so vague, undefinable, and all-
encompassing as individual privacy."" 5 ' The court then noted that
inferring broad constitutional rights not expressly granted by the
Constitution is not a proper role for the judiciary. 152  Therefore,
because the Constitution "does not encompass a general right to
nondisclosure of private information," the court held there was no
violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights. 153
8. Doe v. Marsh
In Doe v. Marsh, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York held the constitutional right to privacy in one's
HIV or AIDS status is conditional and may be overcome by (1) the
government's interest in having or using the information or (2) a
waiver of the right through an individual's prior disclosure. 154 In
Marsh, the New York State Education Department published an HIV
awareness guidance document. 155 The document contained the full
names of individuals living with HIV, including those of the two
plaintiffs. 156 The plaintiffs claimed that while participating in the
program to create the document, neither had disclosed their full name
and none of the discussions were open to the public, though they were
both otherwise active in the HIV/AIDS advocacy community. 157
Therefore, plaintiffs argued they had not waived their right to privacy
in their HIV status.158 The defendants countered that regardless of
whether plaintiffs had waived their right to privacy, they were entitled
to qualified immunity because the right to privacy was not "well-
settled" at the time the events took place.' 59
151. Id. at 740 (quoting J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Doe v. Marsh, 918 F. Supp. 580, 585-86 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
155. Id. at 583. The document was intended for those who wished to create
programs to help prevent the spread of HIV and that employed the services of
people who were infected with HIV or AIDS. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
Evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the court held that
when the events occurred in 1992, it was clear the right to privacy
was not absolute.' 60 The court then stated what was unclear was what
constitutes a waiver under New York law but concluded the plaintiffs'
actions would allow a reasonable person to find they had waived their
rights. 161
B. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to treat similarly situated people in a similar way. 162
The Clause does not prohibit states from classifying its citizens, so
long as such classifications are not made arbitrarily.' 63 The Supreme
Court has established three standards of review for equal protection
claims: strict scrutiny, where a government action must be based on a
compelling government interest; intermediate scrutiny, when an
action must be substantially related to an "important" government
interest; and a rational basis test, where an action must be "rationally
related" to a legitimate government interest. 164  The nature of the
allegedly discriminatory classification determines the standard used,
however, laws regarding individuals with HIV or AIDS would most
likely be evaluated under the rational basis test, asking whether the
law is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
1. Romer v. Evans
In 1996, the Supreme Court ruled that a Colorado constitutional
amendment prohibiting individuals who are "homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual" any legislative, judicial, or civil rights protections, violated
the Equal Protection Clause.' 65 In Romer v. Evans, plaintiffs sought
to enjoin enforcement of Amendment Two of the Colorado
160. Id. at 585 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) and Doe v.
City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1994)).
161. Id. at 586-87.
162. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 83 (1911).
163. Id. at 78, 83.
164. See generally PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING CASES AND
MATERIALS (Paul Brest et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000).
165. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
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Constitution, claiming it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 166 The Court stated that where a law neither
impairs a fundamental right, nor implicates a suspect class, a state
statute will be upheld if rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.1 67 The Court then evaluated the State's claim that it was
protecting its citizens' First Amendment rights, 168 determining the
Colorado amendment imposed discriminatory practices upon a single
group of people, inflicting upon gay, lesbian, and bisexual people
"immediate, continuing and real injuries that outrun and belie any
legitimate justifications that may be claimed for [the amendment]. ' 69
Because the Constitution does not permit disadvantage "born of
animosity," the Court held Amendment Two violated the Equal
Protection Clause.' 70
Regarding HIV surveillance programs, this case would probably
be of little help. The Colorado amendment expressly stated
homosexuals and bisexuals in its language, classifying a separate and
identifiable group. Most name-based reporting systems would not
distinguish HIV-positive homosexuals from HIV-positive
heterosexuals or any other group. If this was the case, the statute
would most likely not pass the rational basis test. Further, this would
not promote the ultimate goal of stopping the spread of HIV in the
general population. The case above would be helpful, however, in an
action against the denial of homosexual or bisexual rights specifically.
2. Middlebrooks v. State Board of Health
In Middlebrooks v. State Board of Health, the Supreme Court of
Alabama held that the State's statute requiring name-based reporting
for certain diseases and conditions, including HIV and AIDS, did not
violate the individual's right to privacy or the physician's right to
equal protection. 17' In Middlebrooks, the state health department
166. Id. at 624-25.
167. Id. at 631.
168. Id. at 635. The State argued its concern was "for other citizens' freedom
of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have
personal or religious objections to homosexuality." Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 634-35.
171. Middlebrooks v. State Bd. of Health, 710 So. 2d 891, 893 (Ala. 1998).
brought suit against a physician for failing to report the names and
addresses of his HIV-positive patients, as required by statute.' 7 2 The
physician made two arguments. First, he claimed the name-based
reporting requirement violated his patients' right to privacy in their
HIV status and, second, the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause because manufacturers of confidential HIV-testing kits are
similarly situated to him, but are not required to report the names and
addresses of the purchasers. 7 3 Addressing the right to privacy in
medical information relating to diseases such as HIV and AIDS, the
court weighed the Westinghouse factors and held that preventing the
spread of the virus is a legitimate governmental interest. 174 Further,
there are adequate safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
the medical records.' 75 In addition, the court reasoned the State can
require disclosure to state representatives responsible for the health of
the community; thus, the statute's disclosure requirement in this case
did not impermissibly violate an individual's privacy right.'
76
Regarding the physician's equal protection claim, the court
determined that the state's classification was reasonable because the
manufacturers of confidential HIV-testing kits are out-of-state and do
not know the identities of the persons being tested. 177 Further, they
have no information about the purchaser's HIV status, in contrast to
physicians who do gather this information.'78 Therefore, the court
upheld the state's name-based reporting statute because there was
neither a violation of HIV-positive individuals' constitutional right to
privacy, nor the physician's rights under the Equal Protection
Clause. 179
The effect of this ruling would appear as follows. As long as the
state or federal regulation provides adequate safeguards ensuing non-
disclosure, a court applying the Westinghouse factors will most likely
rule in favor of its validity. Further, the seventh factor, "whether
172. Id. at 892.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 893.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or
other recognizable public interest militating toward access," seems to
be broad enough to incorporate a name-based reporting system.' 
80
An argument under the Equal Protection Clause may have greater
strength. In Middlebrooks, the court did not address whether an in-
state manufacturer or vendor is "similarly situated" to an in-state
doctor.' 8' This line of reasoning may prove convincing.
V. IMPACT
A. Concerns
HIV was identified in 1983 and the test for HIV antibodies
became available a few years later. 8 2 Since that time, there has been
considerable dissention about whether the names of those infected
with HIV, in addition to the mere fact of infection, should be reported
to state and federal public health agencies. This part discusses several
of the issues that surround the ongoing debate.
1. Funding
One of the most influential factors in support of HIV reporting is
that federal funding is often allocated based on the impact of the
epidemic on states, which depends on HIV data as well as AIDS
cases. 8 3  Because of this, some commentators believe that those
states that report HIV cases by code, such as California, will not be
able to adequately express their true need for federal assistance.' 84
States such as California will therefore be at a disadvantage and
theoretically shoulder more than their share of the burden.1
8 5
180. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580 (3d Cir.
1980)
181. Middlebrooks, 710 So. 2d at 893.
182. See AEGIS, supra note 24.
183. See California Performance Review, supra note 7.
184. Id.
185. Id.
Laws concerning HIV testing and surveillance were affected by
the reauthorization of the Ryan White CARE Act in 2000.186 Prior,
funding for this and other federal AIDS programs were based on
AIDS surveillance data.'87  With increasing awareness of the
limitations of this information,' 88 the new law requires that HIV case
data be incorporated into the total count for local and state areas
beginning in 2005, unless it is determined at that time that adequate
data is not yet available. 18
9
In addition, the retooled CARE Act creates incentives for states to
employ name-based HIV reporting systems.1 90  The Act now
establishes a thirty million dollar authorization to increase partner
notification programs. 19' In order to receive these funds, states must
186. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Fact Sheet: Ryan White
Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Act (Dec. 18, 1998),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/1998pres/981218d.html (last visited on
February 2, 2005) [hereinafter White Fact Sheet]. The Ryan White CARE Act was
passed by an overwhelming bipartisan majority on August 18, 1990, in honor of
Ryan White, a teenager from Indiana whose experience with AIDS helped educate
the nation about the range of needs of people with the disease. Id. The Act
supports the development of systems of HIV/AIDS care at the local level and seeks
to establish less expensive outpatient and primary care and prevent costly
emergency room and hospital visits. Id. Sadly, Ryan died on April 8, 1990, just a
few months before Congress passed the Act in his name. Id.
187. Id.
188. See discussion supra Part III.
189. Chris Collins, HIV/AIDS Surveillance and Reporting in the United States
(Feb. 2001) at http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
190. See White Fact Sheet, supra note 186.
191. Collins, supra note 189. Partner notification or "contact tracing" is
another means by which pubic health officials identify and contact people who may
have been exposed to a particular disease. Id. Partner notification for HIV has long
been a controversial subject, as many find it an invasion of privacy and may
discourage people from seeking HIV testing and treatment from government
agencies. Id. Under the 2000 CARE Act, programs receiving Title III funds must
inform individuals during post-test counseling that "it is the duty of infected
individuals to disclose their status" to partners. Id. While the San Francisco AIDS
Foundation concedes partner notification is an important component to halting the
spread of the disease, the process can only take place if people get tested in the first
place. San Francisco AIDS Foundation: HIV Reporting and Partner Notification in
California at http://www.sfaf.org/policy/partner-notification.html (last visited on
Sept. 26, 2004). The Foundation expressed concern that name-based reporting
deters some individuals from getting tested, thus they never learn their HIV status
and, in turn, are unable to inform their partners of the potential risk. Id. The
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implement partner notification programs, as well as conduct HIV
reporting in a manner recommended by the CDC. 9 2 The law further
states preference will be given to "states that have HIV reporting
systems that are 'sufficiently accurate and reliable." ' 193  The new
CARE Act raises the concern that incentives for name-based reporting
will lead more states to use this method. 1
94
2. Treatment
As this comment acknowledges, fewer people are dying of AIDS
and the number of AIDS cases each year is declining, due in large
part to modem treatment and drug therapies.195  These trends are
expected to continue as more individuals infected with HIV are
Foundation urges California to maintain the unique identifier HIV reporting system
to "ensure confidentiality and enhance the trust of individuals testing for HIV,"
ultimately resulting in more effective partner notification. Id. Also in support of
this argument, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund notes data indicates
"people who refuse to participate in partner notification do so because of fear that
their anonymity will be compromised or that their partners might retaliate against
them." Hanssens, supra note 70.
192. The CDC considers HIV data from code-based systems to be unreliable
and will not include the data in nationally accumulated HIV infection case count
totals until it has passed a quality review by the Institute of Medicine. National
Center for HIV, STD and TB Prevention: Centers for Disease Control, 14
HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, Technical Notes 33, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/hasrl402/technotes.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
The Commission argues the CDC is unlikely to confirm California's current
information for use in allocating Ryan White funds and could cost the state up to
fifty million dollars and cause reduced services to clients. California Performance
Review Report, supra note 183.
193. White Fact Sheet, supra note 186.
194. In response to the revamped 2000 CARE Act, California Senator Dianne
Feinstein noted the CDC "has the technical capacity to accept code-based data" and,
along with Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy and thirteen other members of
Congress, requested the CDC take immediate steps to accept HIV data from all
states, including those that do not report by name. Press Release, Office of Senator
Dianne Feinstein, Senator Feinstein Calls on CDC to Accept California's H1V Data
(May 4, 2004), available at http://feinstein.senate.gov/04Releases/r-cdc-hiv.htm
(last visited Sept. 26, 2004). Apparently, the Commission will not find support for
its cause in this Sacramento office.
195. See discussion supra Part III.
treated.' 96  However, early detection and treatment are crucial. 197
New combination drug therapies with protease inhibitors have
improved the health and prolonged the life of people infected with
HIV.' 98 Studies suggest the treatment not only helps the patient but
also decreases the likelihood of transmission.' 99 Studies also show
that such therapies are more effective the earlier they are initiated in
the course of the HIV disease. 20 0 Thus, more so than when there were
fewer effective treatment options and less need for early detection,
there may be a compelling argument for an HIV reporting system that
provides links between patient and treatment, namely name-based
reporting. On the other hand, if concern over having one's name
reported deters some people from getting tested "some individuals
will not learn their HIV status at all"2 1' and some studies have found
"no connection between name reporting and health department
follow-up" or improved access to health care services.20 2
Early testing is critical not only for treatment purposes, but to stop
individuals from unwittingly passing the virus to others.2 3 In either
case, it is clear the present impact of the epidemic will be increasingly
difficult to evaluate without some sort of HIV reporting data.
3. Stigma and Deterrence
The notion that AIDS is a highly infectious disease contributes to
the stigmatization of those who are infected. In fact, HIV, the virus
196. See id.
197. See AEGIS, supra note 24.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Collins, supra note 189.
202. San Francisco AIDS Foundation, HIV Reporting and Partner Notification
in California, supra note 191. In addition, the Foundation found people testing
positive for HIV in states that use code systems receive referrals upon learning of
their status. Id. Further, in these states "because people tend to test closer to their
date of initial infection," they actually receive care sooner than in a name-based
reporting system. Id. The Lambda Legal Defense Fund also argues "people with
HIV do not get into care after testing positive at sites where names are reportable
any faster than after being tested at anonymous sites [where names are not used]."
Hanssens, supra note 70.
203. Ornstein, supra note 52, at 3.
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that causes AIDS, is not spread by casual contact.2 °4 HIV is not
transmitted through the air or through skin-to-skin contact or other
informal touching.2 °5 Rather, the virus is generally transmitted
through the exchange of blood, semen, vaginal secretions, or from
mother to child during childbirth or through breastfeeding. °6 Thus,
in truth it is not easily spread.20 7
The social stigma that may accompany public knowledge of a
person's HIV status may discourage individuals from getting tested or
seeking treatment.208 One study found that of those who delayed
accessing care more than one month after testing positive, ten percent
cited fear of being reported to the government as a reason. 20 9 The UI
system preserves anonymity, names are not collected into a single
registry and there are fewer confidentiality concerns. Those who fear
stigmatization and discrimination, and those who do not but would
still prefer to remain un-named, will be encouraged to get tested and
the public health need for HIV data collection will be fulfilled.
204. See AEGIS, supra note 24.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. Though this is true for the disease, some advocates argue HIV should be
included on California's list of eighty required name reported diseases, along with
AIDS, syphilis, food poisoning, and measles. Ornstein, supra note 52, at Al. The
article quotes the president of the Los Angeles AIDS Healthcare Foundation,
claiming that as long as HIV is treated as "special and separate and so dreaded that
you can't even talk about it, then it's going to reinforce that view." Id.
208. "It's not so much, 'Will the state know?' as much as, 'Who else is going
to? . . . People are so paranoid about other people finding out." Id. at A3. For
Latino and other immigrant communities, a name-based reporting system would
have "particularly negative public health consequences." Martha Escutia, AIDS Is
Still Stigmatized, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2000, at A5. The Latino community has a
general distrust of the government. Coupled with the fear that one's HIV status
could affect immigration status, HIV name reporting would likely be a strong
deterrent for this community in getting tested. Id.
209. San Francisco AIDS Foundation, HIV Reporting and Access to Care
Services in California at http://www.sfaf.org/policy/access-care.html (last visited
on Sept. 26, 2004). A 1999 study found that sixty-three percent of forty-two repeat
testers would forego testing if name reporting was required. HIV Reporting in L.A.
County, supra note 30, at A3. However, this study had few participants and did not
mention the availability of anonymous testing. Id.
Another study reported only a small proportion of respondents
even knew which HIV reporting system was used by their state."'
The main factors cited for not being tested or delaying testing were:
fear of learning they were HIV positive, thinking they were unlikely
to have been exposed, thinking they were negative, not wanting to
think about being positive, and thinking there was little they could do
if they were HIV positive. 211 Of those participants who have never
been tested, concern about having one's name reported to the
government was cited as one of the factors for not testing for nineteen
percent of the respondents and the "main factor" for two percent.
212
Regardless, due to the different, but equally significant impact of
either name-based or UI HIV reporting in deciding which surveillance
system to use, a state should give proper consideration to all of the
factors involved in the decision to get tested.
Any surveillance system must acknowledge and account for social
stigma and potential deterrent effects by ensuring the protection of the
privacy interests of HIV infected individuals. There should be
punishment for intentional or negligent disclosure. Otherwise, the
social risks may outweigh the public health benefits, tilting the
balance toward having no surveillance system at all. Finally, to
ensure the HIV reporting system does not deter even a small number
of people from seeking testing, the CDC recommends that all states
continue to make anonymous testing available.213
210. CDC, HIV Testing Among Populations at Risk for HIV Infection, 47
MORTALITY & MORBIDITY WKLY REP. 108 (1998), available at
http://www.thebody.com/cdc/testing/testing.html (last visited on Oct. 28, 2004).
211. Id.
212. Id. Another study by the San Francisco Department of Public Health
supported this conclusion, finding "fear of reporting is an infrequently cited reason
for deterring or delaying testing." S. Schwarez et al., Does Name-based HIV
Reporting Deter High-Risk Persons from HIV Testing? Results from San Francisco,
35(1) J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 93 (2004). However, doctors
at the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF) concluded name-based HIV
reporting systems "could be related to delays in testing." Name-based HIV
Reporting Policies Do Not Deter Testing, CDC HIV/STD/TB PREVENTION NEWS,
Oct. 16, 2000, http://www.aegis.com/news/ads/2000/AD001876.html (last visited
on Sept. 26, 2004).
213. Ornstein, supra note 52, at A4.
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4. Confidentiality Concerns
Public health authorities have the duty to act in order to protect
the public health. One of the most useful and frequently used
methods of protecting the public involves surveillance systems to
track infectious diseases.2a 4 Such systems work by connecting
infected individuals to resources for treatment and support services.
215
Surveillance systems also help officials understand the impact of a
disease, monitor its progression, guide allocation of resources, and
evaluate the effectiveness of interventions.21 6  However, federal
tracking systems have always raised concerns about civil liberties and
interference with the doctor-patient relationship. 217
HIV is an infectious disease and public health officials maintain it
should be reported in the same manner as other such conditions, such
as hepatitis, measles, and AIDS.218 Supporters of the name-based
system note states already have the names of HIV patients on file if
they receive care under federally funded programs, such as
214. HIV Reporting in L.A. County, supra note 30. For a complete list of
California's reportable diseases and conditions, see
http://lapublichealth.org/acd/reports/doseasepluscmr.pdf (last visited on Sept. 26,
2004).
215. HIV Reporting in L.A. County, supra note 30.
216. See id. at 2.
217. See generally MARK S. SENAK, HIV, AIDS, AND THE LAW: A GUIDE TO
OUR RIGHTS AND CHALLENGES (1996). Though there have been few recent
breaches of security in states that use name-based surveillance, opponents of the
system point to the following incident of information misuse. In Florida, a county
health worker brought home lists of HIV and AIDS patients' names to determine
the medical status of potential sexual partners. Craig Pittman, Mortician Guilty of
Revealing AIDS List, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 30, 1997, at I B. A friend copied
the list and mailed the names of over 4,000 Florida residents to local newspapers.
Id. Also, in Illinois, a statute was enacted authorizing the state to go through its
registry of HIV infected persons in order to determine the HIV status of state health
care workers. ACLU, HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting: A Public Health
Case for Protecting Civil Liberties (Oct. 1997), available at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cftm?ID=14512&c=27 (last visited on Oct. 17,
2005). The statute also authorized the state to notify former patients of their
potential exposure to the virus. Id.
218. Ornstein, supra note 52. "As long as we treat it [HIV] as something
special and separate and so dreaded that you can't even talk about it, then it's going
to reinforce that view." Id.
Medicaid. 2 9  Furthermore, HIV reporting will result in earlier
treatment, improved tracking of infected persons, and increase the
testing of partners. 22
0
Those who prefer using codes argue the government will misuse
this sensitive data to deny medical insurance and employment
opportunities, that revealing one's HIV status will result in public
persecution and social stigma, and that the potential for a
confidentiality breach will deter those who are at risk from getting
tested and seeking medical care. 221  The bottom line for both
arguments is that HIV places a person in the category of the "other,"
"treating that person differently because of a particular distinctive
characteristic or set of characteristics that vary from the norm. "222
Not respecting and protecting one's HIV status may negatively affect
that individual's physical well being, as well as many other aspects of
their life.223 There must be considerable safeguards in place to
prevent information misuse and errant disclosure.224
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See discussion supra Parts V.A.2-4. Despite the fact that a person's
medical information is generally sensitive and private, thought should be given to
the diverse composition of the population of HIV infected individuals. Much of this
group is composed of already marginalized social groups, such as homosexuals and
minorities. See generally Senak, supra note 217, at 8. Typically, homosexual
political activist groups stress the right to privacy and express concern over the
impact the AIDS crisis will have on their further acceptance into mainstream
society. Id. The rate of HIV infection among minority groups has risen and
continues to rise. Id. Minorities are inherently marginalized and traditionally
mistrustful of the federal government. Id. Therefore, some advocates for these
groups "vigorously oppose" any effort that would "senselessly drive individuals
away from HIV testing and care." Escutia, supra note 208, at A2.
222. Senak, supra note 217, at 81.
223. Id.
224. The Commission stresses California has statutory protections for public
health records, which the state has reworked specifically for HIV and AIDS, and
state and local health departments must adhere to federal security and
confidentiality standards. California Performance Review, supra note 7, at 3.
California has no documented or reported cases of illegal or inappropriate
disclosure of case information from the state's AIDS registry. Id. (noting
California's lack of documented cases, but compare note 214)
HIV Reporting in CaliforniaFall 2005
580 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-2
5. Other Concerns
The Commission points out several technical challenges presented
by California's current UI reporting system. Between July 2002 and
July 2004, 163,328 laboratory tests were reported to the local health
department.225 Of this total, 26,022 were unmatched, requiring
investigation by the local health department to ensure there is no
duplication of reported cases.226 There is a significant backlog of
cases pending investigation (12,556 as of July 2004) and the
Commission argues the process is "inefficient, burdensome, and
expensive" because health care providers do not comply with logs,
potential coding errors, and "staff bum-out., 227  Further, cross-
referenced logs risk confidentiality because they are necessarily
accessible by multiple parties. 228
An often-unmentioned point of particular concern is the inherent
limitation of all HIV case reporting systems. AIDS reporting is fairly
complete; nearly all people with AIDS have been diagnosed and the
majority of cases are reported within a year.229 In addition, in-depth
data about risk factors and demographics is usually included.230 An
HIV reporting system, however, would provide data only on those
individuals who are HIV positive and choose to be tested non-
anonymously or to seek HIV-specific health care. This is certainly
less than the total population of people infected with HIV.
Also, HIV reporting collects data at the time the infected person is
tested, rather than at the point of infection. "HIV diagnosis typically
occurs within two years of AIDS diagnosis. 231 Therefore, the data
225. HIV Reporting in L.A. County, supra note 30, at 2.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. The UI system is "labor intensive, less accurate, and more complex
than the name-based system." Carla Rivera, A Proposal to Track New HIV Cases
by Name Instead of Code Could be the Most Vexing Part of a Health System
Overhaul, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2004, at A24. "California is the only state among
the five largest that requires codes for HIV reporting and names for reporting
AIDS." Id. Those in support of the current system contend that, "even with name
reporting, many jurisdictions say they don't have the time to report, so to say this
would fix the system completely is false." Id.
229. Johri et al., supra note 9.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 3.
collected from HIV reporting would represent HIV infections from
merely weeks to several years old. This is likely to reflect differences
in the population that are not easily identified or addressed.232
Though better than none at all, current HIV data is far from ideal.
Experts suggest it be "viewed as partial data on HIV prevalence,
rather than incidence." '233 The recommendation stands to "consider
what degree of accuracy we need from [HIV] data in order to achieve
our aims, and what costs we are willing to incur to do so."
234
B. Implementing Name-based Reporting in California
The Commission stresses no additional resources will be needed
to make California's HIV reporting system consistent with its AIDS
reporting system.235 A name-based AIDS reporting system is already
in place and the HIV cases will simply be reported by the same
database.236 The Commission predicts the system can change, and all
health providers, laboratories, and state and local health departments
can fully convert, within six months and current code-based files
would be updated within one year.2 37 The Commission further
proposes that California should require laboratories that monitor
CD4+ cell counts report this information as potential unreported
AIDS cases, thereby helping California qualify for additional federal
funds. 23
8
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a compelling need to monitor HIV infection accurately to
provide health officials with the most complete and reliable
information about the present incidence and future course of the
epidemic. There are, however, considerations regarding an
232. See generally Escutia, supra note 208 (explaining why Latinos may be
hesitant to seek early HIV testing).
233. Johri et al., supra note 9, at 3.
234. Id.
235. California Performance Review, supra note 7, at 3.
236. Id.
237. Id. All records maintained by UI would thus be identified by name as new
data are received. Id.
238. Id. California is one of only thirteen states that do not require it. Id.
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individual's right to privacy and the health and wellbeing of the
community. Therein lays the conflict between name-based versus
unique identifier HIV reporting systems.
Both systems are likely to be constitutionally sound, as long as
confidentiality provisions are in place and enforced. Though the right
to privacy in personal information is not clearly established, the
Supreme Court has indicated there is a right to privacy in one's HIV
status, though this right may be outweighed by compelling
government interests, such as the need for comprehensive HIV
surveillance data to protect the greater public health. In this area, an
equal protection challenge is unlikely to succeed because people with
HIV are not a suspect class and keeping one's HIV status confidential
is not a fundamental right.
Currently, California's regulations require that HIV case reports
must be made via unique identifier. This method provides a balance
between public health and individual privacy interests. The UI
system promotes confidentiality, provides a sensitive and informed
response to the issues, and offers safeguards against misuse of
personal medical information. It also reduces fear of social stigma
and deterred or delayed testing because the code cannot readily be
traced to patient source. This, in turn, may slow the spread of HIV
among those who would otherwise remain unaware of their status.
The federal government has given each state the authority to
decide whether to report HIV cases by name or by code and each
must do so by undertaking its own analysis of the need for accurate
and complete data, as well as the importance of protecting the privacy
rights of its citizens. California has chosen, up to this time, to adopt
the unique identifier system. The Los Angeles County Commission
on HIV Health Services recently concluded this system should be
abandoned and name-based HIV reporting system should be
implemented because the latter method is more beneficial for the state
overall. This proposal was approved in October 2004; the
Commission will resume the debate in Sacramento into 2005.
